It’s worth drawing attention to the Study and Measurements of the RPKI Deployment. This is a recently published thesis analysing the deployment of RPKI and the quality of the data, but is also worth reading for its comprehensive documentation of routing incidents, the problems they can cause, and mitigation measures that can be implemented.
The analysis reveals that the global percentage of IPv4 address space covered by a Route Origin Authorisation (ROA) was 6.03% in September 2015, although this figure varies widely between the RIR regions. The RIPE NCC and LACNIC lead the way with 18.67% and 13.87% respectively, AfriNIC comes close to the average at 5.31%, but ARIN registers just 1.98% and APNIC even further behind with just 0.40% .
Perhaps more interestingly though, an authentication analysis undertaken between March 2012 and September 2014 revealed issues with the registration of many RPKI resources, as well as a couple of RIR repositories. However, whilst the percentage of invalid RPKI-covered prefixes in 2012 was as high as 21%, this progressively dropped to just over 7% by September 2015 which indicates a decrease in problems as RPKI deployments has risen.
It’s also interesting to note that even where invalid prefixes were found, most of them were covered by another valid or not found prefix. This suggests that dropping invalid prefixes from the routing table may be less problematic than previously thought by network operators.
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