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# ONLINE ADVERTISING AND HIDDEN HAZARDS TO
# CONSUMER SECURITY AND DATA PRIVACY

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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For the past year, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee has been examining issues central to consumer privacy and security on the Internet and in the broader online economy. Central to this segment of the economy is the online advertising industry, which continues to grow in importance. In 2013, U.S. online advertising revenue for the first time surpassed that of broadcast television advertising as companies spent $42.8 billion to reach consumers.¹

The online advertising ecosystem is highly complex. Online advertisers do far more than merely disseminate text, graphic, or video advertisements. Underlying the work of online advertisers are sophisticated systems that are able to identify and target specific consumer groups with relevant advertising, as well as state-of-the-art security practices to monitor the integrity of these ad delivery systems. The ability to target advertising is a key function of online ad delivery systems, and advertisers are willing to pay a premium of between 60 and 200 percent for these services.² With the continuing boom in mobile devices, the importance, and complexity, of digital advertising is likely to continue increasing in years to come.³

Although consumers are becoming increasingly vigilant about safeguarding the information they share on the Internet, many are less informed about the plethora of information created about them by online companies as they travel the Internet. A consumer may be aware, for example, that a search engine provider may use the search terms the consumer enters in order to select an advertisement targeted to his interests. Consumers are less aware, however, of the true scale of the data being collected about their online activity. A visit to an online news site may trigger interactions with hundreds of other parties that may be collecting information on the consumer as he travels the web. The Subcommittee found, for example, a trip to a popular tabloid news website triggered a user interaction with some 352 other web servers as well. Many of those interactions were benign; some of those third-parties, however, may have been using cookies or other technology to compile data on the consumer. The sheer volume of such activity makes it difficult for even the most vigilant consumer to control the data being collected or protect against its malicious use.

Furthermore, the growth of online advertising has brought with it a rise in cybercriminals attempting to seek out and exploit weaknesses in the ecosystem and locate new potential victims. Many consumers are unaware that mainstream websites are becoming frequent avenues for cybercriminals seeking to infect a consumer’s computer with advertisement-based malware, or “malvertising.” Some estimates state that malvertising has increased over 200% in 2013 to over 209,000 incidents generating over 12.4 billion malicious ad impressions.⁴ According to a recent

³ Id.
A study by the security firm Symantec, more than half of Internet website publishers have suffered a malware attack through a malicious advertisement.\(^5\)

The Subcommittee seeks to highlight this specific aspect of online security. The Internet as a whole, as well as all the consumers who visit mainstream websites, is vulnerable to the growing number of malware attacks through online advertising. While there are many other significant vulnerabilities on the Internet, malware attacks delivered through online advertising are a real and growing problem.

The complexity of the online advertising industry makes it difficult to identify and hold accountable the entities responsible for damages resulting from malware attacks. Those attempting to exploit the Internet for criminal purposes are certainly the most culpable, and ensuring the government has adequate criminal enforcement authority is critical to deterring this activity. Yet, if responsibility for malware attacks is laid solely on cybercriminals, commercial actors may have reduced incentives to develop and institute security measures for fear of becoming the liable party if something goes wrong. The Subcommittee’s investigation shows that lack of accountability within the online advertising industry may lead to overly lax security regimes, creating serious vulnerabilities for Internet users. Such vulnerabilities could grow worse in the absence of additional incentives for the most capable parties on the Internet to work with consumers and other stakeholders to take effective precautionary measures.

### a. Subcommittee Investigation

With this investigation the Subcommittee seeks to highlight malvertising, a growing threat to consumers and the online industry. The threat malware poses to consumers is not new, and the sources of malware and the vulnerabilities it exploits are often well documented. Malware can exploit malicious code in pirated software,\(^6\) or vulnerabilities in mainstream software and operating systems. Although malware is most commonly hosted on websites with little or no security oversight, or even completely fraudulent websites visited by consumers, each year more consumers are delivered malware through mainstream websites that may have been compromised or are unwittingly serving malicious advertising.\(^7\)

Several legislative proposals to strengthen Internet privacy and security have stalled, and there currently is no sector-specific federal data privacy law for Internet companies.\(^8\) Self-regulatory standards set by the online industry, while having significant privacy guidance, do not outline comprehensive security standards. Furthermore, the FTC has brought no cases related to malware transmitted through advertisements, and has not issued comprehensive regulations to curb deceptive or unfair practices in online advertising, including setting minimum safeguards on consumer data collection practices or establishing liability for damages caused by advertisements.

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that transmit malware attacks on Internet users.\textsuperscript{9} To address privacy issues in online advertising, in February 2012, President Obama urged the industry to implement a “Do Not Track” button that would allow users to control the extent to which they are tracked on the Internet for online advertising purposes.\textsuperscript{10} However, the Do Not Track initiative has stalled, with advertisers and consumer groups unable to agree on even a definition of what constitutes “tracking.”\textsuperscript{11}

The Subcommittee conducted an investigation focusing specifically on the features and vulnerabilities in the online advertising industry that invite malware attacks. The Subcommittee also sought to highlight the potential hazards to private consumer information which result from consumer visits to even mainstream websites. The Subcommittee surveyed Internet participants and interviewed representatives from major ad networks, ad exchanges, data brokers, self-regulatory bodies, the Federal Trade Commission, consumer protection groups, and other participants in the online advertising industry to identify the vulnerabilities that have led to significant hazards to consumer safety and loss of consumer privacy online. Every entity contacted by the Subcommittee cooperated with requests for information.

b. Investigation Overview

In December 2013, an Internet user visited a popular, mainstream website. Without any further action on her part, her computer was infected with a virus: all the personal information, usernames, and passwords she used on her device could have been stolen, and her computer hijacked.\textsuperscript{12} The owners of the website she visited had no idea that the attack had taken place because the virus came not from the website itself, but from an embedded online advertisement managed by the Internet company Yahoo’s online advertising network.\textsuperscript{13} The user did not need to click on the advertisement—indeed, if the mainstream website she visited had time to load onto her computer before the malware was delivered, the frame where the advertisement would have gone would have been empty because the cybercriminals didn’t even bother putting an image in.\textsuperscript{14} The owners of the website where the advertisement ran did not even know who had delivered the malware because, in today’s complex online advertising industry, websites often have no direct relationship with the entities that advertise on their sites. Although Yahoo reacted promptly to the attack, as many as 2 million consumers may have been exposed to the covert advertising malware.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{9} As opposed to, for example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s Privacy Rule for health information.
\textsuperscript{11} David Goldman, Do Not Track proposal is DOA, CNN (July 16, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/16/technology/do-not-track/.
\textsuperscript{13} Whitney, supra.
\textsuperscript{14} Interview with Yahoo, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 16, 2014).
In February 2014, cybercriminals launched a similar attack on YouTube through an advertisement delivered by Google. As in the Yahoo attack, the user did not need to click on the advertisement in question. Google also responded quickly to that attack. Similar attacks have struck across many online advertising platforms.

As it turned out, in the December 2013 attack, Yahoo’s network was compromised by a hacker who had stolen a Yahoo employee’s credentials, not through any structural weakness unique to Yahoo. But cybercriminals have numerous methods to evade security measures. For example, cybercriminals time their attacks carefully, often picking U.S. holidays or Friday afternoons when they believe online traffic will be high and there will be fewer security personnel available to react. The practice is so pervasive that when law enforcement personnel raid cyber-criminal residences and offices in Russia and other foreign countries, they find calendars extensively marked with U.S. federal holidays and three-day weekends.

These incidents demonstrated the importance of educating the public on the threat of malvertising. The Subcommittee discovered no evidence to suggest Google or Yahoo’s ad network is any more vulnerable to malware attacks than any other major online ad network. Yahoo and Google appear to follow standard industry practice. However, the industry as a whole remains vulnerable to these forms of attack.

The prevalence of vulnerabilities in the online advertising industry has made it difficult for individual industry participants to adopt effective long-term security countermeasures. Many entities use “scanning” to search for malicious advertisements, an automated process that mimics loading each advertisement onto a webpage on test machines to see if malware is transmitted. However, this scanning is rendered increasingly ineffective by cybercriminals who endeavor to, in essence, learn the geographic location of the scanners and then direct malicious advertisements away from those scanners. In other instances, cybercriminals change the nature of an advertisement after it has been scanned and cleared, turning an initially benign advertisement into malware.

Beyond scanning, most protective measures for consumers and their data come from industry-led voluntary compliance regimes and the contractual relationships between entities in the advertising ecosystem. But those voluntary compliance regimes and contractual arrangements are often incomplete, unreliable, or poorly enforced. As the online advertising industry grows increasingly complex, it is also becoming more difficult to ascertain responsibility when consumers are hurt by malicious advertising or data collection. A cautious citizen can avoid becoming a victim of crime in real life by, for example, avoiding bad neighborhoods and keeping a wary eye on the street traffic. But, online, a visit to even a reputable website can now result in thousands of dollars in damage to the consumer and the compromise of private information at the hands of actors most consumers don’t know are present.

17 Id.
Vulnerabilities in online advertising stem from the fact that advertisements online differ in nature from advertisements broadcast on radio or television. On radio or television, the content of the advertisement is transmitted by the same party that hosts the rest of the content on the station. A radio station, for example, may play a recording of an advertisement on the same frequency and equipment it uses for playing songs. A television station may broadcast commercials from the same studio that is transmitting the evening news. By contrast, if a user visits a mainstream website, the server that hosts the website is often not the server that selects and delivers an advertisement that runs on the website.

Host websites most commonly sell ad space on their sites through an intermediary, most often an ad platform operated by well-known tech companies. These intermediary companies manage “real estate” on the host websites, filling the spaces set aside by the host with advertisements. These intermediary companies also typically gather data on Internet users for the purpose of individually targeting online advertisements to those users when they visit partner websites. Through a complicated series of Internet transactions, the intermediary companies—often referred to as ad networks or exchanges—ultimately direct an Internet user’s browser to display an advertisement from a server controlled by neither the ad network nor the original host website.

Separating the party who delivers the online advertisement from the party who runs the host website means that the consumer who visits the host website is forced to trust her data and security to a party unknown to her. While a consumer might think visiting an online news site is safe because of the mainstream trustworthiness of the entity, the consumer’s computer and personal information are actually at the mercy of dozens, or even hundreds, of other businesses and individuals that such websites may not even be aware of or have a direct relationship with.

The Subcommittee’s investigation has revealed that host websites often do not select and cannot predict which advertisements will be delivered by the intermediary ad networks that rent space on their websites. They may not know what entities are running advertisements on their site until they receive feedback from ad networks after the fact. In fact, many host websites rely on ad networks, exchanges, supply-side platforms (SSPs) and demand-side platforms (DSPs) to handle security and quality control. In some cases, host websites are not consulted about what kind of cookies are used, what types of consumer data are being collected, or what vulnerabilities for malicious software are contained in the advertisements being run on their websites.

Today, most ad networks and exchanges also have limited control over the actual content of the advertisements whose placement they facilitate. While many do robust scanning to detect malware, the ad networks and exchanges do not control the server that ultimately delivers the advertisement to the host website. Sometimes, a malicious advertiser will initially appear benign, but change its advertisement once it has passed through initial scans. On other occasions, a malicious party will infiltrate the ad network itself and pass malware on to unsuspecting consumers.

Despite the difficulty in eliminating bad actors from the online advertising ecosystem, ad networks are currently engaged in multiple industry-led efforts to set best practices guidelines.

\[18 \text{ For instance, Yahoo, Google, and Microsoft all operate ad networks.}\]
While the ad networks uniformly force advertisers to agree to follow codes of conduct drawn up by voluntary self-regulatory agencies like the Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) or the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA), the scope of the codes of conduct and the oversight of company compliance with these standards can be limited. For example, NAI has just seven employees reviewing or auditing 91 companies.\(^{19}\) The codes themselves are predominantly oriented toward privacy concerns, and do not comprehensively address online advertising malware security.

The complex interactions underlying the online advertising industry that make it vulnerable to malware attacks also underscore the difficulties in enforcing restrictions on the collection and use of sensitive consumer data. Multiple companies told the Subcommittee that, while they do scan for malware, there is no scanning or automated process in place to check for compliance on the part of advertisers who limit the operation of cookies used to collect consumer data. While self-regulatory codes or particular contracts might require advertisers or ad networks to limit their collection of consumer data to non-personally identifiable information (non-PII), there is little systematic oversight to ensure that practice conforms to the contractual obligations.

Self-regulation in the online advertising industry has worked in some areas, but needs strengthening in some key respects. On the privacy side, self-regulatory groups such as the DAA and NAI have created guidelines and standards widely adopted by online advertising companies. Detection of deviation of those standards and punishment for noncompliance has sometimes been weak, as examples in this report indicate, but there are enforcement mechanisms that do hold companies accountable in some cases. Comparable standards and enforcement mechanisms have not materialized for online advertising security, however. A new industry effort to address fraudulent advertising called Trust in Ads was launched on May 8, 2014.\(^{20}\) While the existence of such an effort is a positive development, further efforts to create real self-regulation on security in online advertising will be needed to make meaningful progress.

At this time, government rules regarding online advertising also fail to comprehensively safeguard consumers or level the playing field for companies working to prevent advertising malware. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the key government agency overseeing online activities, has brought over 100 enforcement actions related to online data privacy and security problems. However, most of the FTC’s online enforcement actions have been brought under the auspices of statutes prohibiting companies from engaging in "deceptive" practices, although the FTC also has enforcement authority to stop "unfair" practices.\(^{21}\) In deceptive practice cases, a company typically has made a specific promise not to engage in a particular practice, but does so anyway. Such cases, while egregious, can only be brought when a company makes a specific representation and then fails to follow it. While the FTC has brought cases against some companies under its authority to regulate "unfair" practices, industry participants claim not to have a clear understanding of what practices are actually forbidden.\(^ {22}\) In addition, although the FTC has pursued Internet security cases, those cases have focused primarily on improper storage of personal information. Congress has not passed legislation on this topic, and the FTC has

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\(^{19}\) Subcommittee interview with NAI (Jan. 31, 2014).
\(^{22}\) Interview with Marc Groman, President and CEO, Network Advertising Initiative, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 31, 2014).
brought no cases related to malware transmitted through advertisements, and has not issued comprehensive regulations to curb deceptive or unfair practices in online advertising, including setting minimum safeguards on consumer data collection practices or establishing liability for damages caused by advertisements that transmit malware attacks on Internet users.23

The online advertising industry can be complex and difficult to understand. In such an environment, determining responsible parties when things go wrong can be difficult. What is clear, however, is that the one party who is least capable of monitoring and regulating advertising—the consumer—is the party who currently bears the full brunt of the losses when the system fails.

c. Findings and Recommendations

Findings. Based on the Subcommittee’s investigation, the Report makes the following findings of fact.

1. **Consumers risk exposure to malware through everyday activity.** Consumers can incur malware attacks without having taken any action other than visiting a mainstream website. The complexity of the online advertising ecosystem makes it impossible for an ordinary consumer to avoid advertising malware attacks, identify the source of the malware exposure, and determine whether the ad network or host website could have prevented the attack.

2. **The complexity of current online advertising practices impedes industry accountability for malware attacks.** The online advertising industry has grown in complexity to such an extent that each party can conceivably claim it is not responsible when malware is delivered to a user’s computer through an advertisement. An ordinary online advertisement typically goes through five or six intermediaries before being delivered to a user’s browser, and the ad networks themselves rarely deliver the actual advertisement from their own servers. In most cases, the owners of the host website visited by a user do not know what advertisements will be shown on their site.

3. **Self-regulatory bodies alone have not been adequate to ensure consumer security online.** Self-regulatory codes of conduct in the online advertising field do not comprehensively address consumer security from malware. In addition, the self-regulatory efforts in online security to date have been dependent upon online ad networks for their funding and viability, creating a potential conflict of interest in their dual roles as industry advocates and standard-setting bodies. The self-regulatory bodies prioritize industry representatives over consumer advocates in the standard-setting process.  

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23 As opposed to, for example, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act’s Privacy Rule for health information.
4. **Visits to mainstream websites can expose consumers to hundreds of unknown, or potentially dangerous, third parties.** Subcommittee analysis of several popular websites found that visiting even a mainstream website exposes consumers to hundreds of third parties. Each of those third parties may be capable of collecting information on the consumer and, in extreme scenarios, is a potential source of malware.

5. **Consumer safeguards are currently inadequate to protect against online advertising abuses, including malware, invasive cookies, and inappropriate data collection.** Cybercriminals are constantly finding new ways to evade existing security methods. Self-regulatory codes do not significantly address online advertising security, and data collection protections are often limited in scope, and underutilized. Current FTC safeguards are insufficient to comprehensively protect consumers from online advertising abuses.

6. **Current systems may not create sufficient incentives for online advertising participants to prevent consumer abuses.** Because responsibility for malware attacks and inappropriate data collection through online advertisements is undefined, online advertising participants may not be fully incentivized to establish effective consumer safeguards against abuses.

**Recommendations.** Based upon the Subcommittee’s investigation, the Report makes the following recommendations.

1. **Establish better practices and clearer rules to prevent online advertising abuses.** Under the current regulatory and legislative framework, legal responsibility for damages caused through malvertising usually rests only with the fraudulent actor in question. Since such actors are rarely caught and even less frequently able to pay damages, the harm caused by malicious advertisements is ultimately born by consumers who in many cases have done nothing more than visit a mainstream website. While consumers should be careful to keep their operating systems and programs updated to avoid vulnerability, sophisticated commercial entities, large and small, should take steps to reduce systemic vulnerabilities in their advertising networks. If sophisticated commercial entities do not take steps to further protect consumers, regulatory or legislative change may be needed so that such entities are incentivized to increase security for advertisements run through their systems.

2. **Strengthen security information exchanges within the online advertising industry to prevent abuses.** Some online advertising companies claim they do not share information about security hazards with other companies, because of fears they will be accused of violating antitrust laws by cooperating with competitors. The Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission recently issued joint guidance suggesting that the sharing
of cyber threat-related information would not trigger antitrust liability. Those agencies should clarify the extent to which online advertising participants may exchange information about security hazards without incurring antitrust or other liability. If necessary, Congress should pass legislation that removes legal impediments to the sharing of actionable cyber-threat related information and creates incentives for the voluntary sharing of information.

3. **Clarify specific prohibited practices in online advertising to prevent abuses and protect consumers.** Self-regulatory bodies should endeavor to develop comprehensive security guidelines for preventing online advertising malware attacks. In the absence of effective self-regulation, the FTC should consider issuing comprehensive regulations to prohibit deceptive and unfair online advertising practices that facilitate or fail to take reasonable steps to prevent malware, invasive cookies, and inappropriate data collection delivered to Internet consumers through online advertisements. Greater specificity in prohibited or discouraged practices is needed before the overall security situation in the online advertising industry can improve.

4. **Develop additional “circuit breakers” to protect consumers.** Given the complexity of the online advertising ecosystem, more “circuit breakers” should be incorporated into the online advertising system, systems that introduce check-points that ensure malicious advertisements are caught at an earlier stage before transmission to consumers. Online advertising industry participants should thoroughly vet new advertisers and perform rigorous and ongoing checks as often as feasible to ensure that advertisements that appear legitimate upon initial submission remain so.
II. BACKGROUND

In order to understand some of the hazards consumers face in the online advertising industry, it is necessary to understand two different processes: (1) how data is collected on Internet users by third parties and (2) how online advertisements are delivered while making use of that data. The online advertising industry has evolved to make extensive use of those two processes, presenting challenges to consumer safety and privacy today.

a. Data Collection in the Online Advertising Industry

1. Cookies

Since the inception of the Internet, cookies have been the primary tools by which companies transmit information about Internet users.24 Best conceptualized as an identity card for a particular machine that accesses the Internet, cookies are small text files placed on an Internet user’s computer hard drive or browser that store information about a user’s interactions with a particular website.25 When an Internet user visits a website, the user’s browser sends a request to the website’s server to load the page in question. In addition to the request for the page, the user’s browser is programmed to send along information from any cookies placed by the website’s server. If there are no such cookies—either because the user has never visited the website before or because she has deleted the cookies on her hard drive—the website’s server may assign a new cookie for use in the current session and potentially on subsequent visits.

The most basic function a cookie serves is to identify a device. With a cookie, websites can know how many unique machines—and, by extension, roughly how many unique visitors—come to their site. By allowing a website to identify individual visitors, cookies can help websites provide useful services to visitors. For example, many anti-fraud provisions are cookie-based, and most online “shopping cart” functions need a cookie to confirm that the user who added one item to their cart is the same user who has navigated to a different part of the website.

2. First-Party vs. Third-Party Cookies

A cookie that is placed by the website a user actually visits is called a first-party cookie. If a user visits an online shopping website, she might have a cookie placed on her machine so that the company can recognize the user when she move to another page on the site and remember what she put into her online shopping cart.

By contrast, a third-party cookie is one placed by a website other than the one the user directly accessed. If a user visits most ordinary websites (e.g., a newspaper website or a blog), some third party (or third parties) will likely place a cookie on that user’s computer. Almost every website examined by the Subcommittee called some third party or parties who operated

25 Id.
cookies on that website.\textsuperscript{26} As discussed above, a cookie is placed in response to a browser’s request to load a page. When a user visits a website that runs a third-party cookie, the host website instructs the user’s browser to contact the third-party. The third party sends back whatever content the user’s browser requested, as well as a cookie. This interaction can be displayed schematically as follows:

\textbf{Figure 1: Third-party cookie placement on a user’s machine.}

\section*{3. Tracking Users Through Cookies}

While cookies themselves simply identify machines, Internet companies can use cookies as a proxy for a single user’s online activities. An ad network’s cookie might note, to use a fictitious example, that one unique user first visited “www.FreshCooking.com”, then “www.FreshCooking.com/vegan.” The ad network can read the webpage uniform resource locators (URLs) and, of course, access the content on FreshCooking.com itself and infer that the

\textsuperscript{26} The Subcommittee detected third-party activity using the “Disconnect Private Browsing” application on a Chrome web browser. As explained on its website, Disconnect “detects when your browser tries to make a connection to anything other than the site you are visiting.” See https://disconnect.me/disconnect/faq#what-is-disconnect-private-browsing. According to DoubleClick’s website, “DoubleClick sends a cookie to the browser after any impression, click, or other activity that results in a call to the DoubleClick server.” Since, in our example, there was a call to DoubleClick’s server detected by Disconnect, we can infer that a cookie was placed through that interaction.
user in question is interested in cooking. It can cross-reference that information with any other recent website visits by that user that it detected through its cookie network (say, a visit to “www.MeatFree.com”). Knowing even only some of the user’s browsing history can allow an ad network to conclude with a high degree of certainty that the user in question is a vegetarian. It can then use that information to deliver targeted advertisements to that user.

4. Data Collection and Advertising

Ad networks are the most prominent third-party cookie users because (a) they directly benefit from the collection of user information and (b) they have a built-in opportunity to deliver cookies every time they deliver an ad. As discussed in a later section in the report, ad networks use the data they collect from cookies to target advertisements as precisely as possible to particular users, trying to infer as much information as they can about each user’s location, interests, and demographic information. The more data these ad networks can collect from different websites on a particular user, the better the inferences they can draw.

The built-in opportunity to deliver a cookie stems from the fact that the host website’s server has to contact the ad network every time it needs an ad. While the ad network does not deliver the advertisement itself—a distinction which will become vitally important in the context of malware—the host website’s server’s call to the ad network allows the ad network to place a cookie.

Ad networks are not the only companies that operate cookies across multiple websites. Data brokers like Acxiom and BlueKai, who collect information on consumers in order to facilitate the targeting of advertisements, have also contracted to place and access their cookies across multiple websites. As discussed above, third parties can deliver a cookie because some part of the host website draws upon content from the third-party server. In the context of advertising, the third-party content requested by the host website is the advertisement itself. A call from the host website opens the door for a cookie to be placed by the third party whose content was called for. However, the third-party content displayed on the host website can be almost invisible—it is very often a single pixel on the screen. Because the host website requested some nominal amount of content from the third-party—even if the content is just a single pixel—the third-party can now deliver its cookie to the user’s browser as well. Thus, data brokers or other entities that deliver no real content to the host website can still deliver cookies by contracting with the host website to place a single pixel on their website.

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28 Id.
30 The arrangement whereby placing one pixel can allow a third party to place a cookie is called a “pixel tag.” See Id.
5. **Cookie Controversies**

The ability to place cookies is highly valuable to ad networks. In fact, advertisers are willing to pay a premium of between 60 and 200 percent for targeted advertisements based on cookies.\(^3\) The privacy implications are equally clear. Cookies can in theory be used to infer damaging personal information about particular users, such as the fact that a user has a certain medical condition. Even less immediately controversial inferences, like the age of a user, can enable criminals to target the very young or elderly with fraudulent advertisements.

Generally, a browser’s default settings leave cookies active, since many benign web functions consumers have come to expect are cookie based. A privacy minded (and tech-savvy) user can avoid all cookie-based tracking if she so chooses. However, very few Internet users actually alter default browser settings that prioritize consumer privacy.\(^3\) The default browser setting therefore makes a tremendous difference in the use of cookies, and consequently how much data is gathered on Internet users.

Furthermore, despite some interest by browser developers to block certain types of cookies, this does not always lead to better consumer privacy. For example, when Apple announced that its Safari browser’s default setting would block third-party cookies, Google used a “workaround” that enabled it to place cookies despite the default setting. Google ultimately agreed to pay a $22.5 million fine to the FTC for that “deceptive” practice.\(^3\) Mozilla also announced that it would block third-party cookies by default in its Firefox browser, but actual implementation has been delayed several times and the online advertising industry has voiced strong disapproval of the measure.\(^3\)

b. **How Online Advertisements are Delivered**

1. **Simplified Process of Ad Delivery**

Online advertisements may appear to be part of the host website that a user visits, just like images in an article online, but they are different in several important respects. First, and most crucially, the advertisements delivered through ad networks are generally not under the control of the host website at the time of delivery. The ads usually do not physically reside on the same server as the main content of the website. Second, while an advertisement in a newspaper is just a static picture, online advertisements can deliver files and whole programs to a user even if the advertisement itself appears to be just an image.

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\(^3\) Charles Arthur, *Why the default settings on your device should be right first time*, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 30, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/dec/01/default-settings-change-phones-computers.


When a user visits a website that uses an ad network to deliver its ads, the host website instructs the user’s browser to contact the ad network. The ad network, in turn, retrieves whatever user cookie identifiers it can. Using those identifiers, the ad network can access its own database to see what other information about the user’s history it has in order to identify the user’s interests and demographic information. The ad network can then decide which advertisement would be best to serve that particular user.

Though the ad network decides which advertisement should be sent, it often does not deliver the actual advertisements. Instead, the ad network instructs the user’s browser to contact a server designated by the actual advertiser. The server that delivers the advertisement is most often called a content delivery network (CDN). It is most often a separate, stand-alone entity, and thus represents another potential vulnerability within the advertising delivery process.

The advertiser’s designated server then delivers the actual image or video to the user’s browser. All of those steps cumulatively occur over the course of about one second.

Two caveats must be made about this summary. First, the actual delivery process can end up being far more complicated. The ad network can go through any number of exchanges and other online advertising companies which exist to help ad networks target a user as precisely as possible. Several experts told the Subcommittee that the actual number of intermediary companies between the host website and the advertiser averages around 5 or 6 in many cases. Those other online advertising companies are discussed at length in another section. For purposes of this section of the report, it is sufficient to note that the ad network (or other companies) that chooses which advertisement to deliver does not control the actual delivery of
that ad, which is a source of a great deal of security vulnerability in the industry. Second, this
depiction obviously applies only to typical third-party delivered advertisements, not direct sales
or other variations that might be found within the online advertising industry.

2. The Role of Ad Tags in the Online Ad Delivery Process

Another important aspect of ad delivery is the complicated manner in which the user’s
browser, the host website, the ad network, and the advertiser communicate with each other. That
communication is ultimately achieved through “ad tags,” which are hypertext markup language
(HTML) code sent between online advertising entities, which will ultimately call up the correct
advertisement to be delivered to a user.35 That HTML code conveys information about the
advertisement space to be filled. The ad tag includes basic details about the size of the space to
be filled as well as cookie-based identifiers to facilitate targeting of the ad. The functioning of
ad tags explains how online advertising companies can send advertisements to users’ browsers
without the advertising companies actually directly knowing what that advertisement is.

Ad tags are the messages that tell online advertising companies what ad to deliver
without actually having to send the advertisement itself between multiple companies. When a
user visits a website, that host website sends an ad tag out to its ad network. That tag will
contain some form of cookie identification so that the ad network will recognize the user. The
host website does not need to know anything about the user in order to facilitate data collection;
all it must do is notify the ad network of the user’s cookie identifier.36 The ad network’s server
will then rapidly call up all available data on the user and decide which advertisement to deliver
(or call upon another outside party to decide which advertisement to deliver). The ad network
will then send an ad tag back through the user’s browser, telling it to retrieve the proper
advertisement at a URL that the advertiser (the customer of the ad network) has specified.

This is where a key vulnerability in the online advertising system lies. The ad network
often performs some manner of initial quality control on the advertisement by examining what
happens when it calls the particular URL of the advertiser. However, the actual file at that URL
can be quietly changed after that initial quality control check so that when a user actually
encounters the ad, an innocuous and safe ad may have been transformed into a vehicle for
malware.37

3. Direct Sale Advertisements vs. Ad Network Advertisements

Not all online advertisements are delivered through ad networks. Some websites still
sell many of their own advertisements directly. Most “floating” ads, where an advertisement
obscures the content of a website, are sold directly.38 Because such advertisements are highly

36 Interview with Craig Spiezle, Executive Director and President, Online Trust Alliance, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 19,
2014).
37 Id.
38 Interview with Mike Zaneis, Executive Vice President, Public Policy and General Counsel, Interactive
intrusive, websites are reluctant to entrust ad networks to choose advertisements that could reflect poorly on the website.

Most direct sales of advertisements are made by popular websites to large advertisers whose products are directly complementary to the website’s focus. Because of the complementary nature of the product and the website, there is less need for targeting ads in the way an ad network can. For example, CNN, a news site, can directly sell advertisements to HBO for its parody news program “Last Week Tonight” and coordinate banner, sidebar, and interactive components of the same advertisement.39

![Figure 3](image.png)

**Figure 3.** Example of direct-sale advertisement, where CNN coordinated the sale of multiple ad-spaces to HBO. Note the ads for “Last Week Tonight” on the left, right, top, and middle of CNN’s front page.

While direct sales minimize user data transmission because they are often untargeted, they also remove the quality-control processes available to ad networks. The host websites are sometimes less technologically sophisticated than ad networks, which can lead to additional vulnerabilities, as will be discussed at length in Part III of this report.

c. Evolution of the Online Advertising Industry

The online advertising ecosystem has significantly evolved over the years to reflect the intricate expansion of the Internet. Today, the online advertising ecosystem is more than just an exchange of advertisements and money – it is an exchange of information that continues to grow as more users access the Internet and either knowingly or unknowingly share their personal data with an attentive and vibrant online advertising market.

39 CNN (Apr. 27, 2014), http://www.cnn.com. The Subcommittee has not confirmed that this particular sale was direct, but the coordination across different sections of the same website is emblematic of direct sales.
Originally, advertisements were exchanged online between an advertiser (or an ad agency) and a publisher (a website). The advertiser directly bought ad space or inventory from a publisher and then transmitted its advertisement to the publisher’s website(s) for public display, much like a billboard near a highway. Each time a particular advertisement was displayed, it was called a single impression.\(^{40}\)

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**Figure 4. Depiction of an advertiser directly buying ad space from a publisher.**

1. **The Rise of Ad Networks**

As publishers created more websites and the opportunity for online advertising increased, advertisers wanted to expand their presence on the Internet and buy more ad space, or “inventory” for specific audiences (based on age, gender, interests, location, etc.). However, it was difficult for advertisers to reach target audience members because, according to online industry experts, Internet audiences were “incredibly fragmented, splitting their online time between many different websites.”\(^{41}\) Advertisers needed a neutral party to analyze the increasing amount of advertising space from publishers to be able to transmit their advertisements to the right users despite audience fragmentation.\(^{42}\) At the same time, publishers needed a way to efficiently sell their inventory and fill in their ad spaces.\(^{43}\)

Thus, in 1997, ad networks were established to serve as a conduit between the advertisers and the publishers.\(^{44}\) Originally, ad networks would receive inventory from publishers like sports magazines or news websites and aggregate or “package” this data into different categories based on age, gender, interests, etc.\(^{45}\) Ad networks would sell these “packages” to advertisers based on the type of audience the advertiser was targeting.

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\(^{42}\) *Id.*


\(^{44}\) OpenX White Paper, supra note 41 at 2.

For example, in the figure below a shoe company and its ad agency may want to run a campaign targeted at male sports fans ages 18 to 24. The shoe company would send this request to an ad network. The ad network, which contracts with publishers, has acquired and packaged ad space, or “inventory”, and offers to sell the shoe company inventory packages. The shoe company reviews these packages and buys inventory that best matches its ad campaign’s audience segment. Based on the type of inventory package the shoe company purchased, the ad network then transmits the shoe company’s advertisement to the publisher providing the selected inventory – a newspaper website in this example.

Figure 5. Depiction of online advertising process through ad networks.

2. The Weaknesses of Ad Networks

While the ad networks provided advertisers an opportunity to target specific audience segments, the process in which the ad networks bought, packaged, and sold inventory created challenges for advertisers and publishers alike. Ad networks often offered advertisers little insight into where advertisements were ultimately placed. This resulted in advertisers often

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46 Id.
47 Id.
having to buy inventory “blindly” and then wait, sometimes for several months, to see whether their ad campaign was effective.48

Additionally, ad networks did not place value on specific ad space and only provided advertisers a set price for an inventory package that contained millions of ad spaces.49 This resulted in advertisers purchasing ad spaces in bulk that might not necessarily attract viewers that are the best match for their ad campaign.50 Thus, advertisers were essentially spending money on a package of ad spaces that were only partially on target.51

Furthermore, in some cases advertisers would buy inventory packages from an ad network that might not collect or sell inventory data from a publisher that would be the best match for the advertiser’s targeted audience. In the example above, the shoe company’s preferred target audience frequently visits the sports news website. However, the shoe company’s ad network may not collect or sell inventory data from the sports news website, which could deal solely with a different ad network. Thus, even though the shoe company’s advertisements are ultimately displayed online to some members of its target audience who visit the newspaper website, the shoe company would be unable to reach members of its target audience who access the sports news website.

In order to avoid this challenge, advertisers would contract with multiple ad networks in an attempt to ensure that their advertisements would eventually reach as many targeted audience segments as possible. However, this method also proved problematic since advertisers were now blindly buying inventory packages from multiple ad networks without insight into where their advertisements were displayed. In some cases, advertisers were buying the same audience segment more than once.52

Publishers also faced great difficulties with the ad network process. Ad networks did not offer publishers a way to identify the best advertisers for their websites. Additionally, publishers would usually work with a series of ad networks in case one would fail to sell its inventory.53 This resulted in many different parties taking a cut from the publisher’s ad space revenue.54

Use of the ad networks was meant to simplify the exchange of information between and among advertisers and publishers by aggregating data into unique inventory packages. However, due to the ad networks’ lack of transparency and their imprecise valuations of ad space, the online advertising industry desperately needed a new business model to promote and efficiently advance the exchange of data in a way that was beneficial to both advertisers and publishers.55

48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 Video, INTERNET ADVERTISING BUREAU UK, supra note 43.
53 Webinar, OPENX, supra note 45.
54 Id.
55 Video, INTERNET ADVERTISING BUREAU UK, supra note 43.
3. *A New Business Model: The Ad Exchanges*

In 2005 the online advertising industry saw the birth of the ad exchanges—a new online advertising business model that would solve many of the problems created by the ad networks.\(^{56}\) Whereas the ad networks forced advertisers into buying ad spaces in bulk (via inventory packages), the ad exchanges offered advertisers the chance to buy ad space individually.\(^{57}\) On an ad-by-ad basis, advertisers could choose where they wanted their advertisement to be displayed and how much they were willing to pay for a particular ad space.

As shown in the figure below, when a person visits a publisher’s website (Step One), that publisher will send out a request to an ad exchange to fill the website’s ad space with advertisements that will be displayed to that particular user (Step Two).\(^{58}\) In its request to the ad exchange, the publisher will provide the user’s unique cookie identifier and information on the type of ad space available (e.g., ad space size).\(^{59}\) Next, the ad exchange passes along the publisher’s advertisement criteria as well as information the exchange has collected on the user to participating advertisers in the exchange (Step Three).\(^{60}\) At this time, advertisers bid against one another in real time for this particular ad space to be displayed to this particular user (Step Four).\(^{61}\) This process is called “real-time bidding.”\(^{62}\) To give a sense of the scale of online advertising, the typical cost for a thousand ad impressions (views of an individual ad) ranges from about $0.50 to $17 depending on the subject of the advertisement and the quality of the host website.\(^{63}\) The ad exchange will then select the highest bidder (Step Five) and send that advertisement to the publisher’s website (Step Six) where the ad space is filled with the ad image (Step Seven) and finally displayed to the user (Step Eight).\(^{64}\) This entire process usually takes less than a second.\(^{65}\)

\(^{56}\) Webinar, OPENX, *supra* note 45.

\(^{57}\) Id.

\(^{58}\) OPENX White Paper, *supra* note 41 at 5.

\(^{59}\) Id.

\(^{60}\) Id.

\(^{61}\) Id.

\(^{62}\) Webinar, OPENX, *supra* note 45.


\(^{64}\) OPENX White Paper, *supra* note 41 at 5.

\(^{65}\) Id.
Ad Exchanges: Real-Time Bidding

Figure 6. Depiction of the online advertising process with ad exchanges.

The ad exchanges offer valuable information to publishers and advertisers alike. On the advertising side, the ad exchange can offer advertisers insight into what ads are performing well and where those ads are being displayed so advertisers can adjust their campaigns to maximize the impact of their ads. On the publishing side, the ad exchange can provide valuable information to publishers on what advertiser or ad agency is buying that publisher’s inventory and how much they are paying for it. This level of insight offered by the ad exchanges is a major improvement from former ad network models.

Additionally, since advertisers buy impressions (views of an ad) individually as opposed to “packaged” deals (as offered by ad networks), they are able to buy specific ad space at much higher prices since they can buy only the impressions they specifically want. As a result of advertisers only buying impressions that they deem valuable, the level of competition for each ad space drives up the price for each impression on a website, with advertisers willing to pay a

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66 Webinar, OPENX, supra note 45.
67 Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
premium of between 60 and 200 percent, which ultimately results in more revenue for the publishers, compared to the noncompetitive environment of the ad network model.

4. The Weakness of Ad Exchanges

While ad exchanges offer many improvements to ad network structures, both are still similar in the sense that advertisers can only bid on ad space from a finite amount of publishers that contract with a particular ad exchange. Thus, since advertisers are limited in the amount of publishers they can reach, they are equally limited in the amount of users they can access as well. Essentially, the ad exchange model alone still leaves advertisers requiring a way to be able to reach across the entire online advertising industry and participate in real-time bidding on ad space from publishers in and outside their ad exchange.

5. Reaching Across the Online Advertising Industry: Demand-Side Platforms

Demand-side platforms (DSPs) are companies that allow advertisers to extend their “virtual” reach across the online advertising ecosystem. Instead of participating with a single ad exchange, advertisers contract with a DSP, which then enters multiple ad exchanges on behalf of the advertiser. This allows advertisers more access to users who view websites owned by different publishers that contract with different ad exchanges.

In the example below, the shoe company might have an advertisement targeted toward sports fans aged 18-24. The shoe company would send this information to a DSP, which then scans the ad exchanges for bids on websites viewed by sports fans aged 18-24. The DSP may find two ad exchanges that are currently auctioning ad space on the sports news website and a sporting goods store’s website respectively, which have just been accessed by members of the shoe company’s target audience. The DSP enters a bidding process on behalf of the shoe company and wins the ad space in both ad exchanges. The shoe company’s advertisement is then transmitted and displayed to the particular users on the sports news website and the sporting goods store’s website, which both meet the shoe company’s target audience criteria. Supply-side platforms work in the same manner, but on the publisher side instead of the advertiser side. They enter multiple exchanges for publishers in order to find the highest-bid advertiser.

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71 Webinar, OPENX, supra note 45.
d. The Role of Self-Regulatory Groups

Although the FTC can and does bring enforcement actions against individual companies, self-regulatory groups currently generate the most specific standards for the behavior of companies in the online advertising industry. Many online advertising companies adhere to standards generated by the Digital Advertising Alliance (DAA) and Network Advertising Initiative (NAI) that govern behavioral advertising and data collection.

Each of those organizations has put forward a code with general guidelines for companies that engage in online advertising. These codes are predominately written and approved by major industry players, with varying, but limited, levels of consumer input. In an interview with the Subcommittee, NAI noted that while consumers have ability to comment on proposed rule changes, ultimate approval authority fell to NAI’s Board of Directors, comprised of industry representatives. IAB also told the Subcommittee that consumers have a limited role in their rulemaking process. Interview with Marc Groman, President and CEO, Network Advertising Initiative, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 31, 2014).

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e. Data Brokers

The FTC has defined “data brokers” as “companies that collect information, including personal information about consumers, from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such information to their customers for various purposes, including verifying an individual’s identity, differentiating records, marketing products, and preventing financial fraud.” In the context of the online advertising industry, the information that data brokers collect and then resell to online businesses (advertisers, ad networks, ad exchanges, publishers, etc.) can help those companies compile data on particular users and then better target online advertisements to those individuals. Yet, many concerns have been raised about the lack of transparency regarding the practices of data brokers, specifically the data brokers’ ability to collect a wealth of information on consumers without the consumer ever knowing that this collection is taking place.

In December 2013, the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation released a Majority Staff Report that focused on the data broker industry and highlighted data broker activities regarding the collection, use, and sale of consumer data for marketing purposes. The staff report found that data brokers collect a vast amount of detailed information on millions of consumers including data points on people’s financial status, what type of car they drive, what types of pets they have, and even whether the consumer is suffering from a medical condition. Additionally, the staff report found that many data brokers, without any consumer permission or knowledge, create profiles of consumers that are financially vulnerable and sell that information to other businesses that are targeting individuals in need of quick cash, loans, or other financial products.

The report found that data brokers combine information on consumers collected both online and “offline” in order to compile the most complete set of data points about a particular person. Essentially, in addition to collecting consumer information online from sources on the Internet, data brokers also store and sell information on consumers concerning their activities offline including purchases and interests. There is little a consumer can do to “opt-out” of their offline activities. Moreover, given the “veil of secrecy” behind which data brokers operate, it is unclear the extent to which consumers can limit data brokers’ access to their personal information that is compiled and eventually sold without consumer consent or knowledge.

74 Id.
76 Id at ii.
77 Id.
78 Id at 30.
79 Id at iii.
III. ONLINE ADVERTISING AND HIDDEN HAZARDS TO CONSUMER SECURITY AND DATA PRIVACY

Through its investigation, the Subcommittee identified a number of hidden hazards to consumers in the online advertising industry. Prominent among these hazards is malicious software (“malware”) delivered through online advertising without any clicks or interaction by a user. Furthermore, the data collection that makes online advertising possible also allows cybercriminals to target their activities against vulnerable users. As the online advertising industry becomes more and more complex and fragmented, there may be less accountability for individual participants. Although the companies themselves also suffer reputational or other damage from these attacks, consumers are often left with little, if any, meaningful remedy for their damages. Self-regulatory bodies could provide stronger oversight to ensure safety in the online advertising arena from these sorts of hazards.

a. Case Studies: Emerging Dangers in Online Advertising

The Subcommittee’s investigation revealed a number of dangers to online users which have already caused significant damage to consumers. For each vulnerability, Subcommittee staff identified actual cases where the vulnerability has already been exploited.

1. Malware From Online Advertising Can Do Damage Without Clicks: YouTube/Google Ad Attack, February 2014

Two of the most important facts discovered by the Subcommittee in its investigation are (1) that malware in online advertising often does not require any clicking on ads by the user, and (2) malware delivered through advertising is found on the most reputable, most popular sites on the Internet and can be delivered through the biggest, most technologically sophisticated ad networks. One incident that highlights both points was a malware attack through Google’s ad network that was delivered to users on YouTube.80

In February 2014, a security engineer discovered that a YouTube link was hosting malware. When she followed up on the lead, she discovered that the malware was actually delivered via an advertisement.81 A user did not actually need to click on any ads on YouTube; just watching a video was enough to lead to an infection.82 The malware in question would examine a consumer’s computer and, when it found whatever machines fit its criteria, it would release a “banking Trojan” virus—designed to break into online bank accounts and transfer funds to a cybercriminal’s account.83 That malware was designed to target users with unpatched versions of Internet Explorer. Google worked with the security engineer to identify the exact ads in question and took steps to prevent a recurrence of similar attacks.84

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81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Interview with Google in Wash., D.C (May 12, 2014).
An unwitting consumer who visited YouTube and encountered this malware would have no opportunity to protect herself from potential financial ruin. If she suffered an attack, she would have little recourse unless she managed to track down the cybercriminal who launched the attack, an almost impossible task for security professionals and completely beyond the capabilities of an ordinary consumer.

2. The Complexity of the Online Advertising Industry Leads to Multiple Points of Vulnerability: Major League Baseball’s Website Delivers Malware, June 2012.

The vision of the online advertising industry as companies that simply connect website publishers and advertisers does not reflect the multiple layers of complexity that have been added over the past decade. A routine advertisement often goes through five or six intermediaries before ending upon a user’s browser. The advertiser will often work through a separate advertising agency, marketer, ad exchange, demand-side platform, and ad network before an ad actually reaches the user’s browser. Each time one of those entities passes along a call for an advertisement, there is an opportunity for the introduction of malware. With more opportunities for bad software to enter the system, each participant has a better case to make that it is not responsible for system-wide security, and it becomes that much more difficult to determine where along the chain something went wrong.

One incident where this point was made clear was the website of Major League Baseball (MLB) in June 2012.85 Many visitors to MLB’s popular website MLB.com were exposed to a malicious advertisement that, when clicked on, downloaded a virus to the user’s computer.86 This malicious ad, which had the potential to impact 300,000 users, was delivered to MLB.com through a compromised ad network that began distributing malware.87 The ad in question was an advertisement for luxury watches that was displayed as a banner at the top of the MLB webpage.

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85 The Subcommittee did not speak with Major League Baseball and based its analysis on expert testimony and publicly available information.
According to reports, when users clicked on the ad, they were prompted to download fake
anti-virus software that “pretends to scan the victim's computer, find files it claims are infected,
and then attempts to get the victim to purchase the ‘Full Version’ to remove the non-existent
threats for the low, low price of $99.99.”

This malware attack only came to light after it was discovered by an online security
company, Perimeter's Security Operations Center. Researchers from that company suspected
that this attack was a result of an infected ad network that distributed the malicious ad to
MLB.com. Evan Keiser, a security analyst at Perimeter described vulnerabilities in the online
advertising industry that resulted in the MLB malvertising attack:

“Sadly, this has become an extremely common issue: well-known and respected
websites inadvertently distribute malware due to one of their hosted syndicated ads being
compromised… The website operator provides a spot [...] where an ad network loads its
ads. Many of these ad networks, in turn, load content from syndication partners and from
other ad networks. At some point down the chain, one of these partners source the web
ad from the advertiser's web server. Because of the multiple layers of syndication
between the website and originating ad server, it can be often very hard to understand
exactly where the ad actually originated. It's only a slight exaggeration to say that the
lack of transparency and multiple indirect relationships can be so complicated that the
average ad network makes the Fulton Fish Market look like the New York Stock
Exchange by comparison.”

The fact that the source of an attack can remain a mystery even after detection further
highlights the lack of accountability within the online advertising industry. Incentives to provide

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88 Fahmida Y. Rashid, MLB.com Serving Fake Antivirus Via Malicious Online Ads, SECURITY WATCH (Jun. 19,
89 Keiser, supra note 86.
90 Id.
security are weakened by the fact that many malware attacks are either never discovered or never publicly attributed to a particular ad network or other online advertising entity.


As anyone who works in an office can attest, Friday afternoons can sometimes bring a lull in activity. Federal holidays are another time when office staffing is minimized. Cybercriminals who exploit the online advertising industry are aware of those facts as well. They deliberately coordinate their attacks to commence at a time when they believe there are as few quality-control personnel at the various advertising companies as possible. Law enforcement personnel have even discovered calendars at the office and residences of cybercriminals in Russia with all federal holidays carefully marked and noted.91

On Friday, December 27, 2013—two days after Christmas and four days before New Year’s Eve—cybercriminals began injecting malware-ridden advertisements into Yahoo’s ad network. While Yahoo had security personnel working through the holidays, the cybercriminals in question were nevertheless successful in their attack. The malware-infected advertisements continued to run until January 3, 2014, when Yahoo discovered the problem, took the ads off their network, and initiated tighter security protocols to prevent future attacks.92 Though Yahoo initially reported that the advertisements were delivered only to Internet users in Europe,93 later reports suggest that machines outside of the European Union were also compromised.94

The malware in question spread without the need for user interaction. Users did not need to click on suspicious-looking ads.95 Indeed, the advertisement in question was not even visible to the victims who visited ordinary websites. Instead, when a user visited a website with Yahoo ads delivered, the user’s browser, at Yahoo’s direction, contacted the advertiser’s server, which delivered malware to the user’s browser instead of the image of an advertisement. The malware then seized control of the user’s computer and used it to generate Bitcoins, a digital currency that requires a tremendous amount of computer power to actually create.96

In this case, the advertisement made it past Yahoo’s security protocols because a hacker had gained access to a Yahoo employee’s account and approved the malicious advertisement in question.97 The attack utilized Yahoo’s ad network as a delivery system, but gained access to that system through the sort of hacking that has been going on for years.

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91 Interview with Craig Spiezle, Executive Director and President, Online Trust Alliance, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 19, 2014).
92 Yahoo provided the Subcommittee with a detailed briefing concerning the causes of the breach and company’s response. The Subcommittee relied on public information when summarizing the event in order to protect Yahoo’s confidential security practices.
95 Interview with Yahoo, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 16, 2014).
97 Interview with Yahoo, in Wash., D.C. (Jan. 16, 2014).
Independent security firms estimate that around 27,000 computers were infected through this one malware-laden advertisement.98 Around 300,000 visitors were exposed to the advertisement, yielding an infection rate of around 9 percent.99 The virus in question would not trigger on any random computer, but only ones with particular operating systems and programs,100 making the virus even more difficult to detect through the ordinary scanning implemented by ad networks and security firms and discussed in detail in the next section.101

That vulnerability within the network emerged simply because a single Yahoo employee’s account was compromised. The Subcommittee’s investigation indicates that other ad networks may also be vulnerable to that method of attack. Yahoo, it appears, meets industry standard practice for security in its advertisements. However, the industry standard appears to fall short of the level required to comprehensively protect consumers who visit popular websites from malvertising.

4. Ad Networks Do Not Directly Deliver the Advertisements They Place, Limiting the Effectiveness of Their Security Measures: “JS:Prontexi” Malware Attack on Multiple Ad Networks, 2010

As discussed in the Background section, ad networks do not deliver the actual image or substantive advertisement (referred to in the online advertising industry as the “creative”) that appears on a consumer’s browser. Because the ad network must engage in millions of these information exchanges each second, it needs a tremendous amount of bandwidth even to simply retrieve small cookie text files. If the ad network were to host the images for each advertisement itself, its bandwidth needs could be thousands of times greater because image files are so much larger than simple text files. To save on bandwidth and decrease the amount of time it takes to load webpages, the images for the advertisements are kept on another server, which is many times owned by an entity separate from the advertiser.

Because ad networks do not deliver the advertisements they place, they need to perform quality control on the advertisements through two basic processes: human oversight and automated scanning. Ad networks regularly deliver millions of ads per minute, a computationally intensive process requiring powerful networked servers. Ads must be selected and delivered in well-under a second, and consequently there is pressure to deliver ads quickly and not tie up server resources and time doing quality control.

Scanning is the automated process in place for quality-control purposes and is actually a reasonably simple concept. The scanning process replicates a situation in which machines located at a few locations around the world load webpages where advertisements run and monitor what they actually do when running on a user browser. When the advertisements are

98 Karimi and Sutton, supra note 93.
99 Id.
100 The attack targeted Windows users with non-updated version of Java.
101 Id.
run through scanning processes, they are tested against multiple browser types, decomposed into component parts, and tested for known viruses or calls to known malicious URLs.\footnote{102}

Cybercriminals routinely attempt to circumvent scanning with several inventive tactics. First, just like ordinary advertisers, cybercriminals can target their malware to execute on only certain devices in specific geographic locations.\footnote{103} In the most basic sense, if the cybercriminals know that the scanners are located in, for example, Palo Alto and New York City, they might direct their malware-laden advertisements to run only in Ames, Iowa. Second, cybercriminals are becoming increasingly adept targeting the types of machines and operating systems their ads run on. With a plethora of machines and operating systems to choose from, it is almost impossible for scanners to test every device and every configuration.

Those deficiencies help explain how one particular malware attack, the “JS:Prontexi” virus, avoided detection by many major online advertising companies in 2010.\footnote{104} The spread of that malware was one of the first published accounts where an advertising malware threat occurred with no user interaction or clicks. JS:Prontexi targeted only Windows operating system users and specialized further by focusing on vulnerabilities in Adobe Reader, Adobe Acrobat, Flash, Java, and QuickTime.\footnote{105} Over the course of four months, the JS:Prontexi virus spread to 2.6 million computers.\footnote{106} 16,300 of those instances of the virus were delivered through Google’s subsidiary DoubleClick, and another 530,000 were from a Yahoo-controlled ad network.\footnote{107} The JS:Prontexi virus spread for over four months before its existence was disclosed to the public by a security company.\footnote{108}

Both Yahoo and Google claimed at the time to have detected the malicious advertisement, but apparently only after many users’ computers were infected with the JS:Prontexi virus.\footnote{109} The difficulty that even the most sophisticated ad networks face in providing comprehensive security suggests that the countless other entities that comprise the online advertising industry may also struggle to maintain security at their companies.

5. **Epic Marketplace and the Limitations of Self-Regulatory Bodies, 2010-2011**

The online advertising industry’s self-regulatory groups are tasked with maintaining industry standards for privacy and security. The theory of self-regulation is that membership in such a regulatory body is an indication to consumers of quality and trustworthiness. Many online advertisers hold up their membership in such organizations as evidence of the propriety of

\footnotesize{\begin{itemize}
  \item \footnote{102}{Interview with Alex Stamos, Yahoo, in Wash., D.C. (May 12, 2014).}
  \item \footnote{103}{Interview with Craig Spiezle, Executive Director and President, Online Trust Alliance, in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 19, 2014).}
  \item \footnote{105}{Id.}
  \item \footnote{106}{Id.}
  \item \footnote{107}{Id.}
  \item \footnote{108}{Id.}
  \item \footnote{109}{Id.}
\end{itemize}}
their operations.\textsuperscript{110} The Subcommittee’s investigation has found few instances of companies being expelled or suspended from one of these organizations for non-compliance with the organization’s code. Even after wrongdoing is discovered by entities other than the regulators, offending companies are sometimes not suspended or excluded from membership in any of those organizations.

For example, in March 2010, Epic Marketplace, an online advertising company, began to engage in “history sniffing,” a method by which a company can determine whether a consumer has previously visited a webpage by examining how the user’s browser displays hyperlinks (purple indicating visited hyperlinks, blue indicating non-visited hyperlinks.)\textsuperscript{111} History sniffing can be an even more powerful tool for data collection than cookies—it enables companies to record user visits to websites outside of its cookie network.

Through this practice, Epic Marketplace could see that users had visited pages relating to, among other things, fertility issues, impotence, menopause, incontinence, disability insurance, credit repair, debt relief, and personal bankruptcy.\textsuperscript{112} Based on that knowledge, Epic Marketplace could identify user interest segments in those areas and use the information for targeted advertisements.\textsuperscript{113}

The practice was discovered by Stanford Security Lab in July 2011. Epic Marketplace’s privacy policy had stated that “[w]eb surfers may elect not to provide non-personally identifiable information by following the cookie opt-out procedures set forth [on its website].”\textsuperscript{114} Because Epic Marketplace’s history sniffing contradicted its privacy policy, the FTC brought an enforcement action against Epic Marketplace. The FTC approved a final order settling charges against Epic Marketplace in March 2013.\textsuperscript{115}

Epic Marketplace was a member of NAI at the time the practice came to light. Despite that fact, NAI’s audits did not discover Epic Marketplace’s history sniffing practice. Once Epic Marketplace’s misbehavior came to light, NAI said that it would launch its own investigation.\textsuperscript{116} During that time, Epic Marketplace remained an NAI member, subjected merely to additional auditing requirements.\textsuperscript{117} Subsequently, Epic Marketplace went out of business, removing it from NAI’s membership lists.

\textsuperscript{110} See, e.g., Turn, Inc. “Social Responsibility”, (“As an industry leader, Turn participates actively in industry groups—IAB, DAA, and NAI—that are establishing safety mechanisms, implementing best practices, and enforcing guidelines to safeguard consumer privacy.”), http://www.turn.com/company/social-responsibility.


\textsuperscript{112} Id. at 2.

\textsuperscript{113} Id.


\textsuperscript{117} Id.
To the extent that the self-regulatory codes are binding, actual detection and punishment of noncompliance is remarkably rare. NAI recently completed its 2013 Compliance Report and, after reviewing 88 members, “NAI still did not find any material noncompliance with [its] Code.”118

6. Direct Sales of Advertisements are Subject to Compromise: New York Times Malware Attack, 2009

Some major websites sell their advertising through direct sales to advertisers, bypassing most of the technology companies who have traditionally dominated the online advertising industry. Direct sales can, in some ways, be beneficial for security: with fewer parties involved, there are fewer ways in which criminals can slip in malware. As one security researcher noted: "I think there is a problem with ad networks, in general. . . . The problem really is with Web sites handing over control of some of their content to third parties."119

By avoiding the major technology companies, however, websites using direct sales have to come up with their own quality control processes, which can be subverted in some cases. 120 One example is the New York Times website’s front-page malware attack of 2009.

In September 2009, the New York Times sold advertising space on its website using both third-party ad networks and direct sales. An advertiser claiming to represent the Internet telephony company Vonage contacted the New York Times offering to purchase advertising space on NYTimes.com.121 Vonage had previously run advertisements through the New York Times, so the newspaper allowed a third-party vendor it was unfamiliar with to actually deliver the ad. For several weeks, the advertiser submitted wholly legitimate-looking advertisements, which the New York Times ran without incident.122 Then, at the beginning of a weekend, the advertiser replaced the Vonage advertisements with an ad proclaiming that the user’s computer was not safe, and that the user should purchase fake antivirus software to protect her computer.123 That fake antivirus software, once placed on a user’s computer, could steal personal data and extort money from consumers hoping to make the virus go away.124

The New York Times is not the only company victimized by fraudulent advertisers. It is not even the only newspaper that has experienced this type of incident. The website of the San Francisco Chronicle (SFGate.com) suffered a similar attack on the same weekend in 2009 as the New York Times. One common attack method is to generate an email address that is close or

120 The incidents in this section are all drawn from publicly available reports, not interviews with the parties involved.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
identical to the name of a well-known company and then contact a website claiming to represent that company. Cybercriminals routinely inject malware in that manner, posing as legitimate companies such as Lexus. 125 The online music service Spotify was hit with a malicious advertisement within its desktop program in 2011. 126 User’s computers were affected without having to click on any advertisements, and the event led Spotify to shut off all advertising for third parties until it could identify the source of the problem. 127

These examples illustrate how the infrastructure of online advertising can be subverted for malicious purposes even when the ad networks are not involved. Additional oversight is required in order to validate the identities of would-be advertisers. In many cases, unfortunately, that sort of examination is either not performed, or it is performed in only the most perfunctory manner.

7. First-Party Websites’ Cookie Usage Depends Heavily on Extent to Which Online Traffic is the Website’s Sole Source of Profit

Companies that primarily provide free content on the Internet logically must find alternative ways of generating revenue. Selling advertising space is the obvious solution, and the more targeted those advertisements are, the more advertisers will pay. 128 The placement of cookies and other tracking mechanisms thus becomes more important for websites dependent on advertising. The online advertising industry is teeming with data brokers willing to pay for the right to retrieve information from cookies. 129

Using Disconnect, an application which detects when a user’s browser is directed to a third-party server (the necessary step to placing or retrieving a third-party cookie), the Subcommittee examined a number of websites to determine the number of third-party servers involved when a consumer visits a particular website. The number of calls to third-party servers varied significantly from site to site. It also varied significantly within the same website, depending on the particular page visited or time of day. 130 However, based on Subcommittee analysis, broad trends emerged. The Subcommittee has observed that websites offering free content tended to have a great number of third-party server calls than websites offering goods or

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125 Mills, supra note 119.
127 Spotify, “We've turned off all 3rd party display ads that could have caused it until we find the exact one.” (Mar. 25, 2011, 4:44 AM), Tweet, https://twitter.com/Spotify/status/51248179039059968.
129 Sen. Commerce Committee Data Broker Report, supra note 75.
130 For example, of the websites tested, none that had more than 100 third-party server calls ever had fewer than 100. Some websites would go as low as 120 third-party server calls on one visit and as high as 1500 at other times. The figures listed in this report are all from specific test visits and are representative of the sites in question. All of the websites listed were checked at the same time of the day and week to correct for any increases in advertising activity to correspond with high or low-traffic times.
services. These relationships with third parties are potentially a large source of revenue for high traffic websites.

For example, a visit to the website of TDBank, a consumer bank, led to only 11 calls to third-party servers:

![Figure 9. A screenshot of TDBank.com with the Disconnect display identifying third-party server calls.](image)

By contrast, a visit to TMZ.com, whose business model is heavily dependent on Internet traffic, yielded 352 calls to third-party servers.¹³¹

In between those two extremes, ESPN—a dynamic company with a suite of business, including activities based on offering free Internet content as well as other cable broadcasting services—had 83 calls to third-party servers.132

The Subcommittee observed a similar trend with other websites—the extent to which a company’s business model depended on online traffic was a strong predictor of the number of calls to third-party servers. Ford, whose profits derive primarily from its automobile sales, not primarily high Internet traffic, also had 18 calls to third-party servers from its website. The Drudge Report, a solely Internet-based news site, had 326 calls to third-party servers. Bank of America had 11 third-party server calls. AT&T had 32 calls to third-party servers. Senate.gov, the website of the U.S. Senate, had no third-party server calls. Wikipedia, wholly dependent on donations from visitors instead of advertising, also had no third-party server calls. Amazon.com, which takes in revenue from sales of goods, had only a single third-party server call.

The results of the Subcommittee’s survey suggest a basic problem: data is valuable, and the more a website depends on traffic rather than non-Internet-based revenue, the more it seems to be willing to forge relationships with third parties that may pay to collect that data. As Internet-based companies become a greater portion of the economy, one could reasonably expect that sales of data to third parties will only increase further.

b. Current Online Advertising Regulatory Authorities Do Not Adequately Address Security Concerns in Advertising

Congress has not enacted comprehensive data-security legislation to guide industry standards and establish enforcement benchmarks for federal enforcement agencies to follow. Instead, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has regulated the online advertising industry primarily under its authority found in Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”). Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, the FTC is empowered to begin enforcement actions, levy fines, and seek injunctions against companies that engage in “unfair” or “deceptive” practices.

Following an investigation, the FTC has the authority to initiate an enforcement action against a company if it has “reason to believe” that the law has been violated. The legislative history indicates that Congress intentionally used the general terms of “unfair” and “deceptive” because it believed that providing a list of unfair or deceptive practices would have inevitably left loopholes susceptible to easy evasion. Thus, the FTC was given the task of determining and identifying unfair or deceptive practices through notice and comment rulemaking, on-the-record adjudication, and policy statements.

139 Id.
141 See H.R.REP. NO. 63–1142, at 19 (1914) (Conf. Rep.) (observing if Congress “were to adopt the method of definition, it would undertake an endless task”).
1. Deceptive Practices Enforcement

To date, the FTC has brought several deceptive practices cases against companies involved in online advertising. However, that enforcement authority essentially requires that a company publicly state a policy that is contradicted by its actions. Thus, FTC deceptive practices enforcement in the online advertising industry has stopped a few clear violations, but has not meaningfully changed what practices are generally considered acceptable.

An act or practice is deceptive when there is (1) representation, omission, or practice, which misleads or is likely to mislead the consumer; (2) a consumer’s interpretation of the representation, omission, or practice is considered reasonable under the circumstances; and (3) the misleading representation, omission, or practice is material.¹⁴²

The most prominent FTC deceptive practices enforcement action to date involving the online advertising industry was against Google. In August 2012, Google agreed to pay a record $22.5 million civil penalty to settle FTC charges that it misrepresented its cookie and targeted-advertising practices to users of Apple Inc.’s Safari Internet browser.¹⁴³

The FTC alleged that Google placed tracking cookies on Safari users who visited websites within Google’s DoubleClick ad network. Google had previously told these users that they were automatically opted out from a Google tracking cookie because the default settings on the Safari browser blocked third party cookies. Google further represented that as a member of the self-regulatory organization, the Network Advertising Initiative, it was required to disclose its data collection and use practices. The FTC alleged that despite these promises, Google exploited a loophole in Safari’s default setting to place a temporary DoubleClick cookie on user’s computers. The initial tracking cookie, in turn, allowed additional tracking cookies from DoubleClick—including advertising tracking cookies that Google represented would be blocked from Safari browsers—to track user’s Internet activities.¹⁴⁴ The FTC referred the matter to the Department of Justice on August 8, 2012 which then filed the complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Northern California in San Francisco.¹⁴⁵ District Judge Susan Illston approved the $22.5 million settlement agreement between the two parties on November 17, 2012.¹⁴⁶

That settlement came after an October 2011 deceptive practices settlement that resolved charges that Google failed to follow its privacy promises when it launched its social network,

¹⁴² Interview with Lisa Harrison, General Counsel, Mark Acorn, Privacy, Molly Crawford, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Maneesha Mithal, Associate Director, Privacy and Identity Protection Division, Chris Olsen, Associate Director, Privacy and Identity Protection Division and Kim Vandecar, Congressional Liaison, Fed. Trade Comm’n in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 21, 2014).
¹⁴⁴ Id.
Google Buzz. The settlement forced Google to implement a privacy program for Google Buzz, submit to FTC audits and reporting for 20 years and face $16,000 fines for any future privacy misrepresentations.  

While the FTC’s enforcement actions against Google were among its most prominent, other deceptive practices enforcement actions have been levied against smaller companies. In March 2011, the Commission brought a deceptive practice action against the online advertising company, Chitika, Inc., alleging that it placed tracking cookies on consumers’ browsers after they opted out of receiving targeted advertisements.

Chitika is an online ad network that engages in behavioral advertising. It uses cookies to track consumers’ browsing activities online to serve them targeted advertisements based on that individual’s Internet activity. When a consumer visits a website within Chitika’s network of publishers, Chitika sets a new cookie or receives information from its tracking cookie that has already been imbedded on the user’s browser. The Chitika tracking cookie contains a unique identification number that allows the company to connect an Internet user’s activity to a particular computer. Each time a Chitika sets a new tracking cookie or receives information from a previously-placed tracking cookie, the company receives more information on the user to tailor advertisements to that particular user. So long as a consumer visits a website in the Chitika network from the same browser on the same computer at least once a year, the consumer will indefinitely retain the Chitika tracking cookie on her browser. Chitika’s network consists of over 350,000 publishers and the information gathered within it helps the service of over 4 billion targeted ads per month.

Internet users have the ability to “opt-out” of having Chitika tracking cookies placed on their browsers. When a user opts out, Chitika sets an “opt-out cookie” in the user’s browser and when a user visits a website within Chitika’s network, Chitika receives the opt-out cookie and does not place any subsequent tracking cookies on the user’s browser. It also does not add any additional information to a previously set Chitika cookie or use the data from the cookie to target advertisements to the consumer. Chitika did not indicate how long the opt-out would last if a user opted out.

The FTC alleged that between May 2008 and February 2010, Chitika delivered opt-out cookies that automatically expired after ten days. After the ten days expired, Chitika placed tracking cookies back on consumers’ browsers who had opted out and targeted ads to them again. The Commission alleged that Chitika’s claims about its opt-out mechanism were “deceptive” within the meaning of Section 5.

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149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
Chitika settled its case with the Commission. The settlement agreement required Chitika to display a clear notice on their website explaining that it collects consumer data and offers an opt-out function.\textsuperscript{154} It also prohibited Chitika from selling or transferring consumer data obtained prior to March 1, 2010 and ordered the company to permanently delete all information stored in Chitika user’s cookies and all IP addresses collected while it employed a defective opt-out system.\textsuperscript{155} Moreover, the agreement required that every targeted ad include a hyperlink that takes the consumer to a clear opt-out mechanism that allows the user to opt out for at least five years.\textsuperscript{156} The order subjected Chitika to five years of FTC monitoring to ensure Chitika’s compliance with the consent decree.\textsuperscript{157}

One other example of the FTC’s deceptive practice enforcement against the online advertising industry came in November 2011, when the FTC settled with the online advertiser, ScanScout. ScanScout is a video ad network that acts as an intermediary between publishers and advertisers. It engages in behavioral advertising, collecting information about consumers’ online activities and to serve targeted ads based on the user’s interest. The FTC alleged that from April 2007 to September 2009, ScanScout used Flash cookies to collect and store user data in its efforts to facilitate the behavioral targeting of video advertisements.\textsuperscript{158} Flash cookies are not controlled through a computer’s browser, so if a user tries to change her browsers’ privacy settings to delete or block cookies, Flash cookies remain unaffected.\textsuperscript{159} Since browsers could not block Flash cookies, users could not prevent ScanScout from collecting data on their Internet activities or from serving them targeted video advertisements.

From April 2007 until September 2009, ScanScout’s privacy policy on its website stated in pertinent part, “[Users] can opt out of receiving a cookie by changing your browser settings to prevent the receipt of cookies.”\textsuperscript{160} The FTC alleged that this false statement constituted a deceptive act or practice in or affecting commerce in violation of Section 5.\textsuperscript{161}

The FTC and ScanScout entered into a settlement agreement on November 8, 2011, which was finalized on December 21, 2011. The settlement required ScanScout to host a notice on its website that read, “We collect information about your activities on certain websites to send you targeted ads. To opt out of our targeted advertisements click here.”\textsuperscript{162} When selected, the hyperlink takes consumers directly to an opt-out mechanism that allows them to prevent ScanScout from collecting information that can identify them or their computer; redirecting the user’s browser to third parties that collect data without their approval; and associating any previously collected data with the user.\textsuperscript{163} As part of the settlement, ScanScout submitted to five years of FTC monitoring for compliance with the order.

\textsuperscript{154} Decision and Order at 3, \textit{In re Chitika, Inc.}, No. C-4324 (June 7, 2011).
\textsuperscript{155} \textit{Id.} at 4.
\textsuperscript{156} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{157} \textit{Id.} at 5.
\textsuperscript{158} Complaint at 2, \textit{In re ScanScout Inc.}, No. C-4344 (Dec. 14, 2011).
\textsuperscript{159} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{160} \textit{Id.}
\textsuperscript{161} \textit{Id.} at 3.
\textsuperscript{162} Decision and Order at 3-4, \textit{In re ScanScout Inc.}, No C-4344 (Dec. 14, 2011).
\textsuperscript{163} \textit{Id.} at 4.
2. Unfair Practices Enforcement

To date, the FTC has not brought unfair practices enforcement actions against companies in the online advertising industry. That absence of enforcement largely reflects the lack of clear standards of conduct within the industry itself. FTC standards for unfair practice depend heavily on industry common practice and the standards set by self-regulatory bodies.

FTC officials informed the Subcommittee that an act or practice is unfair when it: (1) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers; (2) cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers; and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. FTC officials informed the Subcommittee that an act or practice is unfair when it: (1) causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers; (2) cannot be reasonably avoided by consumers; and (3) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. Industry standards and self-regulatory guidelines weigh heavily in the assessment of what constitutes reasonable actions for companies in a given industry.

3. FTC Enforcement Actions Against Online Advertisers Under Other Statutes

The FTC’s authority to regulate online advertising under other statutes tends to be for very specific types of data. The most prominent examples include:

- the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA),
- the Fair Credit Reporting Act,
- the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,
- the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996,
- the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act, and
- the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act.

One specific enforcement action in the online advertising arena was brought under COPPA. That law was enacted in 1998 to protect the safety and privacy of children using the Internet. The legislation prohibits the unauthorized or unnecessary collection of children’s personal information online by operators of Internet websites or online services. The Commission promulgated regulations that applied to any “operator” of a website directed at children that has knowledge that it is collecting or maintaining children’s personal

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164 Interview with Lisa Harrison, General Counsel, Mark Acorn, Privacy, Molly Crawford, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Maneesha Mithal, Associate Director, Privacy and Identity Protection Division, Chris Olsen, Associate Director, Privacy and Identity Protection Division and Kim Vandecar, Congressional Liaison, Fed. Trade Comm’n. in Wash., D.C. (Mar. 21, 2014).
167 Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6801 (instructing the FTC and federal banking agencies to promulgate data-security standards for financial institutions to protect against “unauthorized access to or use of” consumer financial records or information).
information. The FTC's rule under COPPA requires that website operators notify parents and obtain their consent before they collect, use, or disclose personal information from children under 13. The rule also requires that website operators post a privacy policy that is clear, understandable, and complete for users to read.

On March 26, 2012, the FTC filed an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District against RockYou, Inc., alleging that RockYou violated the FTC’s COPPA rule. RockYou is a social game website where users could play games and use the site to upload photos from their computers or web, add captions, and choose music to create a slideshow. Users were required to register with RockYou, using an email address and password, if they wanted to save or edit their slideshows. Registrants were also required to enter a birth year, gender, zip code and country with their registration. RockYou stored the email addresses and passwords in their internal database.

The Commission alleged that from December 2008 through January 2010, RockYou accepted approximately 179,000 registrations from children under the age of 13 without parent consent. Since the website asked for registrant’s date of birth and other personal information, RockYou fell within the FTC’s definition of operator under the rule and it put children’s personal information at risk because the slideshows that the children created could be shared online. Specifically, the FTC charged that RockYou violated the COPPA rule by: (1) failing to spell out its collection, use and disclosure policy for children’s information; (2) failing to obtain verifiable parental consent before collecting children’s personal information; and (3) failing to maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and integrity of personal information collected from children.

RockYou and the FTC entered into a consent agreement and settlement order on March 27, 2012. The consent decree enjoined RockYou from future collection of information from children online and forced the company to delete the information it had already collected in violation of the COPPA rule. Moreover, the FTC fined RockYou $250,000 and ordered the company to post a link to the Commission’s consumer education website on its own website for five years. Finally, the settlement required RockYou to implement a data security program, submit compliance reports to the Commission allow security audits by independent third-party auditors every other year for 20 years.
4. The FTC’s 2010 Proposed Regulatory Framework

The FTC proposed a regulatory framework in December 2010 that noted several of the most pressing consumer hazards in the online advertising industry. That report cast strong doubt on the FTC’s “notice-and-choice model,” under which companies can avoid enforcement action so long as their privacy policies gave notice to consumers, who could then make an informed choice about whether to use a particular Internet service. The FTC noted that “the notice-and-choice model, as implemented, has led to long, incomprehensible privacy policies that consumers typically do not read, let alone understand.” Given the FTC’s criticism of the model it had hitherto used in its enforcement actions, the need for some protection beyond formal notice seemed evident. The framework went on to suggest some basic principles for regulation, and tasked the businesses within the online advertising industry to come up with policies that matched those principles.

c. Incentives to Limit Responsibility for the Harmful Effects of Online Advertising

Many consumers have developed an expectation that web content delivered by reputable sources will be free of dangerous malware. The Subcommittee’s investigation has determined that even the most sophisticated advertisers have difficulty guaranteeing consumer security due in part to numerous structural vulnerabilities in the online advertising model. The current state of law and regulation addressing online advertising is sparse, focusing mainly on criminal actors rather than the responsibilities of intermediaries. While still pursuing criminal actors, the responsibility of industry and private stakeholders to implement precautionary measures should be clarified. The current structure leaves consumers with no recourse when they are victim of a malware attack.

1. Ad-Hosting Websites Often Do Not Know What Advertisements Will be Run on Their Website

Websites that run advertisements delivered by ad networks almost never know all of the advertisers that will operate on their website on any given day. While the host websites can request that certain categories of advertisements be excluded (for example, violent or pornographic advertisements), they are often completely unaware of what advertisers end up operating on their websites until after the fact. Consequently, when a malicious advertisement is delivered to a visitor, the host website can plausibly claim that it had no idea of the danger.

2. Ad Networks do not Control the Advertisement Creative Directly

As discussed above, ad networks—among the most sophisticated technology companies in the world—generally do not have direct control over the advertisements they deliver. Because

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181 Id.
such control would incur bandwidth costs and slow delivery, there is a clear disincentive to retain control over the advertisement’s content. While there are reputational costs associated with malware attacks through ad networks, such costs are only realized if the attack is (a) detected and (b) linked to an advertisement delivered by that ad network. It is difficult for an ordinary consumer to even identify why, or even if, her computer has been compromised. Learning how and from what entity she acquired the malware in question is a near impossibility for the average consumer.

3. Self-Regulatory Groups do not Provide Sufficient Oversight on Security and Privacy issues

The online advertising industry self-regulatory groups are not currently stand-ins for comprehensive regulators. While they do generate codes and provide enforcement for privacy standards, they could improve their practices by expelling or publicly identifying members who are not in compliance with their codes. Industry participants should also expand their self-regulatory efforts into the security realm. While self-regulatory bodies have, in the privacy context, promulgated standards and rules, there have not been any similarly enforced standards regarding the threat from online advertising malware attacks. One industry effort to address security foundered reportedly due to members of the industry “desiring to refocus their resources on aggressively defending industry practices to policy groups and regulatory bodies.”182 New efforts, such as the recently launched Trust in Ads initiative, should strive to issue meaningful security standards to protect consumers.

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